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 Abstract 
Fuelled by the Arab spring, the question of how the rise of internet-mediated 
communication affects authoritarian regimes has received unprecedented attention 
within the discipline of communications. However, in this debate, scholars have not yet 
turned to the concept of literacy and addressed the role of citizens’ knowledge about 
political media in any greater depth. This is surprising since the concept of literacy as 
‘emancipatory knowledge’ has a ‘long and proud history’ (Livingstone, 2008: 60) of 
being linked with processes of enlightenment, political empowerment, and democratiza-
tion. The present study contributes to filling this gap by suggesting four highly 
consequential facets of critical news literacy in contemporary Russia, a high-profile 
hybrid regime. Conceptual development is grounded in western literature and 20 in-
depth interviews with young, urban, and educated Russians.  
Keywords 
Political communication, global media and social change, literacy, audience reception, 
Russia, non-democratic regimes  
 In the wake of the Arab spring, the academic debate on how the rise of internet-
mediated communication affects authoritarian regimes has received unprecedented at-
tention within the discipline of communications. Special issues or sections on the topic 
have been published by major journals such as the Journal of Communication (Howard 
and Parks, 2012) and the International Journal of Communication (Allgui and Johanne, 
2011). However, one classic field of communication research has to date received aston-
ishingly little attention within this literature: the study of audiences. Aside from findings 
from a number of works based on coarse-grained survey data (Lei, 2011; Norris and 
Inglehart, 2011), we still know surprisingly little about how internet users in today’s 
non-democratic regimes navigate and make sense of the political news that they encoun-
ter in their new, now largely internet-based, information environments.  
However, this is precisely where a set of intriguing questions for audience re-
searchers arise. With regard to traditional media environments dominated by television, 
a number of excellent studies have investigated how citizens of non-democratic regimes 
think about and process political news (with respect to Russia, consider for instance 
Oates, 2006; Mickiewicz, 2008). However, these studies have not explored new media 
audiences. Questions that have barely been raised to date include: in the new infor-
mation environments of today’s non-democratic regimes, what specific stocks of 
knowledge do citizens need in order to critically navigate and evaluate political news? 
And how will different stocks of such media-related knowledge impact the ways in 
which citizens of these regimes navigate and make sense of their news? 
With regard to western democracies, cognate issues have recently been exten-
sively discussed and investigated, very often by scholars interested in the concept of 
literacy (for recent overviews of this literature, consider Buckingham, 2005; Coiro et 
 al., 2008; Hobbs, 2011; Livingstone, 2008; Martens, 2010; Potter, 2010). However, 
these scholars have developed their arguments mostly against the empirical backdrop of 
western democracies (for exceptions in this regard, consider Fedorov, 2011; Freire and 
Macedo, 1987; Leung and Lee, 2012).  Thus, while scholars concerned with the impact 
of the internet on non-democratic regimes have barely turned to investigating the role of 
audiences or to the concept of media literacy, scholars of media literacy have barely 
considered the specific conditions of critical literacy with regard to political news in 
non-democratic regimes. Against this backdrop, the primary aim of the present article is 
to link these two academic debates by proposing four facets of critical news literacy that 
are highly consequential in the internet-based information environment of contemporary 
Russia.  
From a global perspective, starting out with a focus on Russia appears intriguing 
since the country is often considered a prime example of a so-called ‘hybrid regime’, 
combining elements of authoritarian and democratic rule (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 
186-201). More specifically, Russia can be regarded as a relatively closed regime that 
pursues an open internet policy (Toepfl, 2011, 2012; Oates, 2006, 2007). In sharp con-
trast to its Chinese counterpart, the Russian internet is currently not being systematically 
filtered (Etling et al., 2010). In this semi-controlled environment, the news literacy of 
citizens can be assumed to be a particularly crucial factor affecting what news internet 
users come across. However, while conceptual development in this study will be 
grounded in empirical data from Russia, it is intended that the conclusions will also 
have a certain heuristic and explanatory value with regard to other (semi-)authoritarian 
regimes. 
Within Russia, this explorative study starts out with a focus on young, urban, 
 and educated citizens because this group is considered in some sense a ‘digital avant-
garde’ of Russian society: its members can be regarded as most fully immersed and 
versed in the new, internet-based information environment. Focusing on this specific 
group, the project will seek to answer primarily two research questions. (1) What are the 
crucial areas in which these young Russians need knowledge (= facets of media litera-
cy) in order to critically navigate and evaluate political news? (2) And, secondly, how 
do different stocks of knowledge in these areas impact how they navigate and make 
sense of their news?  
To work towards answering these questions, the rest of the article is structured 
as follows. The paper first briefly reviews the recent academic literature on media liter-
acy and cognate concepts. It then gives an overview of the Russian media landscape and 
subsequently presents the methods adopted in this study. The next section – grounded in 
western academic literature and 20 in-depth interviews – develops and illustrates four 
important facets of critical news literacy in contemporary Russia. Finally, there is a dis-
cussion of how the findings of this study might contribute to and advance the recent 
academic literatures on (1) media audiences in Russia, (2) media literacies in western 
democracies, and (3) the impact of internet-mediated communication in non-democratic 
regimes.  
Western research on media literacy and cognate concepts 
According to a definition cited widely throughout the literature, media literacy is 
best understood as the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and communicate messages 
in a variety of forms (Aufderheide, 1993; Livingstone, 2008; Martens, 2010). This um-
brella definition is adopted in a wide array of works encompassing the most diverse 
epistemic and disciplinary perspectives (for recent overviews of the literature, consider 
 Buckingham, 2005; Hobbs, 2011; Martens, 2010; Potter, 2010). Moreover, in the past 
decade a vibrant strand of literature on various forms of media-related ‘new literacies’ 
has emerged, with such frequently discussed concepts as cyberliteracy, internet literacy, 
information literacy, digital literacy and computer literacy (Coiro et al., 2008; see also 
Buckingham, 2005; Das, 2011; Hobbs, 2011; Livingstone, 2008; Martens, 2010; Potter, 
2010). One of the central claims of this new body of research is that in the highly medi-
ated societies of the internet age citizens need a wider range of skills and knowledge 
than before in order to cope with their now more complex media environments. 
One way of structuring this vast and interdisciplinary body of literature is to dis-
tinguish between the two traditions of ‘media literacy’ and ‘information literacy’ re-
search (Livingstone et al., 2008). Information literacy research has its origins in the 
fields of cognitive psychology and human-computer interaction. It emerged primarily in 
relation to digital media and, typically, attends more to questions of access. By contrast, 
media literacy research originated in media studies and education contexts. It emerged 
in relation to traditional audiovisual media and attends more to questions of critical un-
derstanding (cf. also Freire and Macedo, 1987). Recently, however, it appears that the 
two traditions have been converging (Livingstone et al., 2008: 108). Within this frame-
work, the present study can be seen as rooted in the media literacy tradition, since it will 
focus more on the question of critical understanding. However, somewhat in the infor-
mation literacy tradition, it develops its argument in relation to an internet-based, mul-
timedia environment.  
A further specific of this study is that it focuses specifically on citizens’ literacy 
with regard to political news. By contrast, in the academic literature critical media (not 
news) literacy is typically discussed as referring to knowledge and skills in a wider 
 range of areas. In a comprehensive survey of 165 articles using the concept, Martens 
(2010) finds that most authors regard knowledge and skills on four facets of the mass 
media as essential aspects of media literacy (media industries, media messages, media 
audiences, and media effects). The 5
th
 edition of Potter’s (2010) popular textbook Media 
Literacy contains chapters on privacy issues, violent content, media industries, media 
ownership, advertising and entertainment, alongside only one chapter specifically focus-
ing on political news. In the chapter on news, Potter posits as important elements of 
news literacy citizens’ knowledge of the working conditions of journalists, their 
knowledge of the influence of media ownership, and their familiarity with such con-
cepts as framing, news bias, objectivity, and balance.  
In a further alternative approach, Kellner and Share (2005) outline five core ele-
ments of media literacy that demand, for instance, awareness of individuals that ‘all 
media messages are constructed’ and that ‘different people may experience the same 
message differently’ (for still other conceptualizations, consider Buckingham, 2005; 
Hobbs, 2011). While the different foci of these western approaches cannot be covered in 
detail here, conceptual development in this article has implicitly drawn heavily on this 
literature. The discussion section will compare and contrast the four facets of critical 
news literacy as they are suggested here for non-democratic regimes with frequently 
cited western conceptualizations.  
Research on media literacy in non-democratic regimes 
With the rise of the internet in the past decade, vibrant academic debates on new 
forms of media literacy education have also emerged in non-democratic states like Rus-
sia, China, and Singapore (Fedorov, 2011; Liao, 2008; Phang and Schaefer, 2009). In 
Russia, even an academic journal dedicated specifically to Media Education (Me-
 diaobrazovaniya) has been published since 2005. However, in non-democratic regimes 
these discourses are mostly not oriented towards the goals of promoting active citizen-
ship and critical approaches to political messages (cf. Fedorov, 2011).  Instead, they 
focus on fostering technical skills and aesthetic and moral judgment, as Liao (2008) 
argues for China. Moreover, these debates are at present barely reflected in major inter-
national journals. The few studies of media literacy in non-democratic regimes that have 
been published in major journals largely avoid the thorny ideological terrain of political 
news. These studies mostly originate in what Livingstone et al. (2008) refer to as the 
information literacy tradition (cf., for instance, Leung and Lee, 2012; an exception to 
some extent in this regard is the work of Phang and Schaefer, 2009). 
Fragmented in Spheres: The Contemporary Russian Media Landscape 
A characteristic feature of the Russian media – and also of media in other hybrid 
regimes – appears to be the co-existence of different spheres that encode social reality 
from starkly disparate ideological perspectives (Toepfl, 2013). In contemporary Russia, 
it makes sense to distinguish at least five spheres: (1) a sphere of official media that 
transmits the ideology of the hybrid regime (consisting of state-controlled TV channels, 
radio channels, newspapers, internet news sites, and politicians’ blogs); (2) a sphere of 
mainstream commercial media where reports are slightly critical of, but largely loyal to, 
the regime (including, for instance, leading yellow press newspapers and news sites 
controlled by businessmen with close ties to the Kremlin); (3) a sphere of liberal-
democratic media (consisting of oppositional internet TV channels, radio channels, 
news sites, and blogs of political activists); and two spheres of (4) communist and (5) 
nationalist media, consisting of smaller clusters of online news sites, newspapers, and 
blogs (for more detailed information on the Russian media landscape, consider Toepfl, 
 2010, 2011, 2013; Etling et al., 2010; Mickiewicz, 2006; Oates, 2007, 2008).  
A second important characteristic of the media landscape of Russia’s hybrid re-
gime is that the official media sphere is overwhelmingly dominant in terms of audience 
reach. At the time this research was conducted, the three most-watched TV channels 
were tightly controlled by the ruling elites and represented the powerful core of the offi-
cial sphere (cf. also Oates, 2006, 2007). By contrast, the reach of the other four spheres 
remained extremely limited. Asked in a survey ‘what is the medium you most often get 
your news from?’, 92 percent of Russians answered TV. 23% said print media, 19% 
online news sites, 19% radio, 16% talking with friends, and 6% blogs, forums, and so-
cial media (Fond Obshchestvennoe Mneniya, 2011).  
However, at the time the research for this article was carried out, this status quo 
was threatened by technological change. While in 2003 no more than four percent of 
Russians went online at least once a week, the number had grown to 48 percent by early 
2012 (Fond Obshchestvennoe Mneniya, 2012). In the new, internet-based information 
environment, traditional state-controlled TV and sharply oppositional news sites are 
now separated only by a mouse-click. Political messages from all five spheres can be 
easily accessed on the same device – at no additional cost, anytime, anywhere, and 
without fear of consequences. In this specific environment, it depends almost exclusive-
ly on the intentional decision of an individual to follow a specific source of news – or to 
avoid it. This intentional decision, in turn, has to be taken on the basis of specific 
knowledge about political mass media. It is precisely these stocks of knowledge of 
young Russians that the following sections will set out to explore. 
 Method 
Participants 
In selecting participants, a purposeful sampling strategy was pursued that com-
bined ‘criterion sampling’ with ‘maximum-variation sampling’ (Lindlof and Taylor, 
2011: 111-113). The goal was to interview a group of young, urban, and educated Rus-
sians (criterion sampling) differing widely in terms of gender, age, studies pursued and 
political views held (maximum variation sampling). The group interviewed was thus 
clearly not representative of Russian society as a whole. Rather, participants were se-
lected in order to explore characteristic patterns of knowledge and media use in a young 
and internet-savvy ‘avant-garde’ of Russian society. In order to recruit participants, I 
posted announcements to the mailing lists of two social science departments at leading 
research universities in St. Petersburg and Moscow and proceeded via the snowball 
method. I continued the process of interviewing until the data appeared theoretically 
saturated with regard to the four facets presented below (cf. Lindlof and Taylor, 2011).  
 In the end, the interviewed group consisted of 12 male and eight female stu-
dents who provided vastly different self-assessments of their political views (cf. Toepfl, 
2013). Participants varied in age between 18 and 26 (median: 21). Fourteen students 
lived in St. Petersburg and six in Moscow. All participants had extensive technical skills 
in using computers and other devices to access the internet, i.e. skills widely referred to 
in the literature as information or digital literacy (Livingstone et al., 2008). All had 
practically 24/7 access to broadband networks. All owned at least one computer. Many 
also accessed the internet through a broad range of other devices, including smart 
phones, mobile phones and tablets.  
Interview context and structure 
 All interviews were conducted by the researcher, in the Russian language, in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow in September and October 2011. Before being interviewed, 
participants signed a statement of informed consent and were guaranteed anonymity 
(their names were changed for the article). The researcher is a 36-year old white male 
who speaks Russian with accent. The data thus emerged in a social situation that most 
interviewees appeared to perceive as an informal, but civilized conversation with an 
interviewer (of slightly greater age and higher social status, but easy-going) from a for-
eign (but generally friendly) country who showed genuine interest in understanding how 
young Russians think. In all interviews, ‘rapport’ was quickly established, understood 
as a situation in which interviewer and interviewee show mutual respect for each other’s 
viewpoints, while not necessarily agreeing on all issues (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011: 
194).  
The interviews lasted between 1 and 2.5 hours and were divided into five sec-
tions. In section 1, I asked for personal characteristics. In section 2, I enquired about the 
devices that participants had access to, and when and where they typically used these 
devices to surf the internet. In section 3, I tried to reconstruct with participants which 
news formats they would access on a typical weekday. In section 4, I set out to explore 
stocks of knowledge that could be considered as dimensions of critical news literacy. 
Facing the methodological issue of exploring participants’ knowledge without imposing 
predefined concepts (Livingstone et al., 2008: 13), I opened section 4 with the simple 
question: ‘what do you think about the political mass media in Russia?’ As the conver-
sations evolved, I tried to follow the specific lines of argument on which participants 
embarked, encouraging them to elaborate on their thoughts. In my questions, I avoided 
bringing up standard western concepts like objective, censored, democratic, independ-
 ent, or free media. Instead, I used either the interviewees’ own terms or everyday lan-
guage. For instance, I asked what an interviewee considered good, bad, or high-quality 
news. Only when participants ran out of ideas of their own did I start probing western 
concepts. I then enquired what interviewees thought of the media as a check on gov-
ernment, as a fourth estate, or as a free market of ideas. In a fifth section of the inter-
view, I discussed two specific news items with participants. The findings of this section 
are reported separately (Toepfl, 2013).  
Analysis and Interpretation of Data 
All interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed, with the first inter-
view transcripts already available for analysis during the process of interviewing. 
Through a process of comparative reading and rereading that encompassed deductive 
and inductive elements (cf. Lindlof and Taylor, 2011: 246-48), I gradually arrived at 
four areas of knowledge that I considered to have particular impact on how participants 
navigated their internet-based news environments. After 20 interviews, the data ap-
peared theoretically saturated with regard to these four dimensions (cf. Lindlof and Tay-
lor, 2011), in the sense that the last five interviews added relatively little theoretical re-
finement to the concepts that I will suggest and illustrate in the next section.  
Four Facets of Critical News Literacy in a Non-Democratic Regime 
In presenting the four dimensions, I will proceed, with regard to each of the four 
dimensions, in two steps. In a first step, I will describe characteristic differences in 
knowledge of a particular dimension that I observed in the group interviewed. In a sec-
ond step, I will illustrate how these differences in knowledge typically affected the ways 
in which participants navigated and made sense of their news.  
Dimension I: Knowledge of the segmentation of the news environment  
 Differences in stocks of knowledge. In the group interviewed, I found highly 
consequential differences with regard to – what I came to call – ‘cognitive maps’ that 
participants used to navigate their news environments. These maps divided the Russian 
media landscape into different segments. They included not only attitudes and complex 
opinions towards each of the segments, but also expectations of what news formats 
could be found in each. I observed basically three types of map. A first group of stu-
dents sketched out a bipolar map that arrayed different media on a one-dimensional con-
tinuum between the two extremes of controlled and not-controlled by the powers-that-
be. A second group drew multi-polar maps that depicted the media landscape as a bat-
tlefield where different elite groups fought for power. A third group operated with a 
map that differentiated between serious and sensationalist segments of the news land-
scape. In each of the three groups, depth of knowledge varied widely. While some stu-
dents could argue the differences between various segments of their map succinctly and 
drawing on a series of examples, others had no more than vague ideas. Some partici-
pants adopted different maps at different points in the interview; the third map especial-
ly could easily be combined with one of the first two. 
Impact on navigation and sense-making. Students who navigated with a bipo-
lar map of controlled vs. less controlled media tended to avoid state TV and other media 
in the official sphere, since they regarded these outlets as news sources of poorer quali-
ty. By contrast, those who navigated with a multi-polar map tended to regard state TV 
as one of many biased sources. Liza (22, 2nd year MA Sociology, multi-polar map), for 
instance, stated that she followed the news on state TV because she trusted a media out-
let controlled by the government more than one controlled by a business oligarch. Stu-
dents who operated with a serious vs. sensationalist map clearly preferred state-
 controlled TV channels over other media. While these students were not strongly aware 
of the fact that these channels were state-controlled, they tended to prefer the state-
controlled channels because these, in general, reported in a less sensational manner. 
Dimension II: Knowledge of news production processes  
Differences in stocks of knowledge. Even if a participant was able to sketch out 
a detailed map of the Russian media landscape, this did not necessarily coincide with 
any deeper knowledge of the conditions under which news was produced in different 
segments. In the group interviewed, I observed stark differences with regard to 
 knowledge of ownership structures and consequences thereof (many Russian 
media are owned by wealthy business oligarchs with close ties to the Krem-
lin); 
 knowledge of typical channels of political and economic pressure on media 
outlets and journalists (such as legal verdicts, paid articles or paid blog 
posts); and 
 knowledge of the extent of pressure on and violence against journalists (Rus-
sia is one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists).  
Many students lacked even basic knowledge in this domain. By contrast, one of 
the most knowledgeable participants was Daniil (22, 1st year MA Sociology). Daniil 
had earned a diploma in journalism from a university in a provincial town, where he had 
also worked as a journalist. In the interview, he distinguished between internal censor-
ship (by the editor-in-chief) and external censorship (for instance, by legal verdicts). He 
was familiar with the fate of former Russian media moguls such as Boris Berezovsky, 
who lost his property and had to leave Russia in the early 2000s. Daniil also had de-
tailed knowledge of present ownership structures in the Russian media market. He 
 knew, for instance, that the oppositional radio channel Ekho Moskvy was owned by the 
state monopoly Gazprom. Daniil had also founded several Facebook discussion groups 
which he described as ‘moderately nationalistic’. According to him, these groups were 
closed down three times without comment. He strongly disapproved of this as limiting 
his freedom of opinion.  
Impact on navigation and sense-making. While the maps participants used 
(facet I) appeared to affect which news organizations they tended to follow, knowledge 
of production processes seemed to be crucial to how students approached and made 
sense of specific news items. Evgenia (18, 1st year BA Sociology), for instance, operat-
ed with a bipolar map of controlled vs. less controlled media; she believed that the level 
of control increased from internet to newspapers to state TV. However, she lacked 
knowledge of the different practices by which the news in these segments was pro-
duced. Without this knowledge, she had difficulties in arguing the differences between 
the segments of her map. Asked, for instance, if she believed that the internet news sites 
that she trusted most were “objective or independent”, she answered: 
I do not even know that. […] It seems that very many facts are hidden. I think the 
internet sites that I visit have many visitors. That means they [the ruling elites] 
follow what information is published there. Probably, they are not a sufficiently 
objective source of information.  
By contrast, Daniil, who had extensive knowledge in this field (cf. above), could 
argue very well which sources he visited and for what reasons and how he engaged with 
the information published there. To quote just one example, he said that it was difficult 
for him to fully trust the oppositional radio channel Ekho Moskvy, since he knew that 
the state company Gazprom owned a majority of shares. But he said that for him the 
 chief editor, Alexei Venediktov, was a ‘person who has authority’. Venediktov had offi-
cially announced that he would leave the channel if the pressure became too strong. 
This was the reason why Daniil, to a certain degree, still ‘trusted’ the radio station as 
long as Venediktov led it. In a similar diligent and informed way, Daniil could also 
evaluate the reporting on state TV channels and the four political blogs that he regularly 
followed.  
Dimension III: Knowledge of the ‘constructedness’ of political messages 
Differences in stocks of knowledge. Participants also differed widely in the de-
gree to which they were aware that social reality could be framed from different ideo-
logical perspectives. While some of the students were fully aware that ‘all media mes-
sages are constructed’ (Kellner and Share, 2005: 374; Potter, 2010), others were not.  
Impact on navigation and sense-making. Students who were fully aware that 
all messages are constructed were able to challenge ‘the power of the media to present 
messages as non-problematic and transparent’ (Kellner and Share, 2005: 374). They 
were aware that political news did not simply reflect reality and thus could not be ar-
rayed on a scale that ranged from more true (closer to reality) to more false (strongly 
distorting reality), but that all political messages were created, shaped and positioned 
through a construction process. Interviewees who were aware of the ‘constructedness’ 
of news were easily able to follow different sources and juxtapose ideological framings. 
Tagyr (21, 1st year MA Economics), for instance, followed – aside from a range of na-
tional media – twelve international newspapers and magazines through his Facebook 
account (amongst others the New York Times and The Atlantic) and an additional 50 
blogs through RSS feeds on googlereader. He consciously compared the framing of 
political events as presented in this international collection of media outlets. He was 
 even able to formulate precise expectations of how certain events would typically be 
framed in the media of different countries.  
By contrast, students who were not aware of the constructedness of social reality 
could only evaluate messages as – to a greater or lesser degree – true or false. Yulia (18, 
2nd year BA Sociology), for instance, was well aware that state TV occasionally omit-
ted or even ‘faked’ certain pieces of information. She had observed, for instance, how 
different media reported different numbers of deaths after a plane crash. Yet, if video 
footage of a meeting or other incident was broadcast on TV, this meant to her that this 
event had ‘most likely really happened’ – i.e. that it was ‘real’. This is why Yulia ‘trust-
ed’ most in TV, since newspaper journalists, in her opinion, could more easily invent 
stories or events. For participants like Yulia, who lacked skills on this dimension, it ap-
peared very difficult to cognitively process the ideologically sharply fragmented dis-
courses produced by Russia’s media landscape. To these individuals, political news in 
Russia often appeared confusing, frustrating, and barely to make any sense, while 
‘truth’ and ‘reality’ remained hidden by dark forces somewhere far beyond their reach.  
Dimension IV: Knowledge of the role of the media in Russian society 
Differences in stocks of knowledge. Participants also differed widely with re-
gard to the ideas they held about the role of news media in Russian society. Some inter-
viewees brought up societal functions of the media right at the beginning of the inter-
view, without being prompted. Other participants, even when asked explicitly towards 
the end of the interview about ‘the tasks or functions media should perform for society’, 
could not think of anything beyond the basic idea that the media should ‘inform’. The 
tasks most commonly mentioned in the group were that news media should ‘guarantee 
transparency’, ‘provide independent information’, or ‘educate citizens’. By contrast, a 
 number of concepts that are typically discussed in western textbooks on media and poli-
tics appeared to be largely absent from the consciousness of the group interviewed. On-
ly a few participants answered that the media should ‘check on government’ or act as a 
‘fourth power’. No participant invoked the ideas of media as a ‘free market of ideas’ or 
a ‘self-righting process of ideas’. Towards the end of the interview, I explicitly brought 
up each of these concepts and asked students what they thought about it. Confirming the 
tendencies observed in the previous sections of the interview, in particular the concepts 
of the ‘media as a fourth power’, as a ‘free market of ideas’, and as a ‘self-righting pro-
cess of ideas’ turned out to be completely new to many students. When I subsequently 
tried to set out the meaning of these concepts, some participants reacted with laughter. 
As it became clear in the conversations, these concepts were clearly dissonant with 
many participants’ prior patterns of thinking about political mass media.  
What normative ideas would interviewees, then, suggest as alternatives? A num-
ber of students brought up the idea that mass media ‘in Russia just as everywhere else’ 
were ‘tools of those in power for guiding public opinion’ (Iosif, 21, MA Economics). 
Another common line of thought was one which I eventually termed the ‘stagnation vs. 
chaos narrative’. Students who produced this argument considered both too much and 
too little ‘media freedom’ to be a problem. While fully unleashing the mass media 
would destabilize the state and result in chaos, excessively harsh control would foster 
corruption, paralyze society and lead to stagnation, as happened in the Soviet Union in 
the 1970s. This narrative was often paired with a negative view of Russian citizens 
whom the interviewees deemed not (or not yet) capable of dealing with pluralistic me-
dia, making political decisions or acting in other respects as responsible citizens. 
Impact on navigation and sense-making. The ideas participants had of the role 
 of mass media affected their patterns of navigation and sense-making in highly conse-
quential, but very complex, ways. Iosif (21, MA Economics), for instance, was one of 
the students who operated with a variant of the stagnation vs. chaos narrative. Like other 
participants who did this, he conditionally approved of the news reporting on state-
controlled TV, even though he was aware that political messages on these channels 
were heavily influenced by ruling elites. However, Iosif considered it the primary func-
tion of the media to ‘generate the right mood in society’. He thought that, when it came 
to politics, ‘not everybody has to know everything’, particularly not people living in the 
countryside. Thus, even though Iosif personally did not watch state TV regularly, he had 
a positive attitude towards it. He believed, for instance, that the recent financial crisis 
did not hit Russia too hard because state TV downplayed it. He considered this a posi-
tive, stabilizing effect of state-controlled media. However, Iosif himself watched state 
TV only very rarely and on specific occasions, such as after the resignation of a high 
official. In addition, on such occasions, he would search the internet for information and 
try to ‘guess what really happened’. Overall, Iosif thus approved of the information en-
vironment in Russia in its present form, even though he approached ‘each and every 
source with a specific skepticism’. By contrast, students who strongly endorsed the 
democratic control function of the mass media showed strong negative feelings towards 
the state-run segment. These participants commented cynically on the news discourse in 
that segment. Thus, most importantly, the stocks of knowledge in dimension IV can be 
regarded as a wider normative framework that encompassed and substantiated the 
knowledge structures in dimensions I to III.  
Discussion 
On Russian audiences, critical news literacy, and new information environments  
 This study advances the academic debate on media audiences in Russia primari-
ly in two ways. Firstly, while previous studies have focused on TV audiences (cf. Oates, 
2006; Mickiewicz, 2008), this project has investigated an audience that is deeply im-
mersed in a new, largely internet-based information environment. As the findings illus-
trate, in this new environment individuals now also need specific stocks of new 
knowledge in order to critically navigate and evaluate political news. With the rise of 
the internet, a wide variety of novel news formats with specific production processes 
have emerged, such as political blogs, social network groups, and YouTube channels. In 
order to engage critically with these new formats, audiences require novel stocks of 
knowledge about the production processes of these new formats (facet II) and about the 
far more complex structure of the overall digital news environment (facet I). In other 
areas of knowledge, there appear to be strong continuities. Highly consequential pat-
terns of thought raised earlier in TV audience focus groups have included, for instance, 
widespread disdain for sensationalist reporting and skepticism with regard to Western 
concepts of press freedom (cf. Oates, 2006: 44-65; Mickiewicz, 2008: 178-206). Over-
all, these continuities seem to be particularly evident in facets III and IV (construct-
edness of messages / role of the media in society). 
Secondly, this study has been the first to deploy the concept of media literacy in 
order to theorize what Russian audiences know about their news. Adopting this concept 
not only facilitated the development of four dimensions that structured the empirical 
findings in a novel and easily accessible way. It also allowed the empirical data to be 
presented within a theoretical framework that has a ‘long and proud history of theoriz-
ing emancipatory knowledge’ (Livingstone, 2008: 60). Most importantly, this account 
thus invites a discussion of the civic and democratizing potential that could spring from 
 developing knowledge about these four facets amongst citizens of contemporary non-
democratic regimes (cf. Livingstone, 2008: 60).    
Critical media literacy in Russia and in the West 
An intriguing question now is how far these four dimensions parallel core ele-
ments of critical media literacy as discussed in western democracies. To summarize, 
many western approaches appear to include elements similar to dimensions II and III 
(Kellner and Share, 2005; Hobbs, 2011; Livingstone et al., 2008; Martens, 2010; Potter, 
2010). By contrast, the concepts that were discussed as dimensions I and IV in this pa-
per are less visible in debates on media literacy in western democracies.  
Dimension I may have emerged in this study as particularly consequential be-
cause the media landscape of Russia’s hybrid regime is much more ideologically frag-
mented than those of many western democracies. In consolidated western democracies, 
mass media discourse on politics is typically firmly rooted in a liberal-democratic con-
sensus. By contrast, in contemporary Russia stark ideological differences divide media 
discourse into a number of spheres, with a strong presence of segments that present so-
cial reality within the framework of non-democratic ideologies (cf. Toepfl, 2013). Being 
aware that such divides exist can thus be seen as particularly crucial to critically navi-
gating the extremely fragmented news environments of semi-democratic hybrid re-
gimes. However, exploring the specific ‘maps’ that citizens adopt in order to navigate 
their news may also be a promising path for future research on media literacy in western 
contexts. As a cognitive tool, these maps could be of increased relevance in the more 
fragmented media environments of the internet age. It could be intriguing for media 
literacy scholars to ask, for instance, whether citizens in western democracies operate 
with maps that are divided into segments according to a perceived difference between 
 right-wing and left-wing media, between high- and low-brow media, or between tradi-
tional mass media and blogs.   
Dimension IV could appear particularly salient in the Russian context because a 
number of widely held western beliefs concerning the mass media were not only absent 
in the group interviewed, but rejected as outright absurd. Ideas that were strongly disso-
nant with participants’ prior knowledge included the notion that mass media could 
‘check on the government’; that they could be ‘free’; that the media could act as a 
‘fourth estate’; or that they could function as a ‘free market of ideas’. The social con-
structedness of these beliefs and their cultural specificity is obvious from the interview 
data of the present study. This is only rarely reflected, however, in western approaches 
to media literacy. A promising avenue for future media literacy initiatives might thus be 
to reflect more thoroughly and contrast how the mass media function in democratic so-
cieties with how the media operate in non-democratic regimes. Currently, the function-
ing of the news media in authoritarian, theocratic, dictatorial, or totalitarian societies is 
rarely broached in programs directed at enhancing media literacy in democratic socie-
ties (Kellner and Share, 2005; Hobbs, 2011; Livingstone et al., 2008; Martens, 2010).  
Critical news literacy and the impact of the internet on non-democratic politics 
One common causal story in current survey studies of audiences in non-
democratic regimes (cf., for instance, Lei, 2011) is that internet use, operationalized 
mostly as access vs. non-access, results in citizens receiving a broader range of political 
perspectives. This, in turn, is alleged to contribute to a ‘more critical and politicized 
citizenry’, to a ‘shift in the power relationship between the state and the society’, and to 
a higher demand from citizens for democratic reforms (Lei, 2011: 311). However, de-
pending on the selection of countries and the conceptualization of variables, other stud-
 ies find negative correlations between internet use and democratic attitudes. Norris and 
Inglehart (2010: 212-4), for instance, in a comparative analysis based on survey data 
from more than forty countries, conclude that ‘use of all types of news media [including 
the internet] consistently showed a negative link with support for democratic principles 
in restricted media environments’. In interpreting these contradictory correlations, Nor-
ris and Inglehart (2010: 212) suggest the causal story that ‘propaganda achieve[d] its 
objectives’.  
Against the backdrop of these two conflicting causal stories currently discussed in 
the literature, one promising way forward may be to devise models that factor in varia-
bles capturing the knowledge about political media of individuals. As the qualitative 
data presented in this study suggest, these knowledge structures can be expected to 
strongly mediate the impact of internet use on individuals’ beliefs. In this study, differ-
ent stocks of media-related knowledge were not only found to be decisive with regard to 
what streams of news came into the view of participants. In addition, this knowledge 
was seen to affect how participants approached and made sense of the ideologically 
starkly dissonant streams of news which appear to be characteristic of the media land-
scapes of many of non-democratic regimes today (cf. Toepfl, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
This study has suggested four important areas in which young Russians need 
knowledge in order to self-consciously and critically access, analyze, and evaluate polit-
ical news – and thus to become ‘aware [of] why they see certain messages and not oth-
ers’ (Lewis and Jhally, 1998: 109). These four areas of knowledge were labeled ‘facets 
of critical news literacy’ and seen as comprising knowledge of (1) the segmentation of 
 the news environment, (2) the news production processes, (3) the constructedness of 
political messages, and (4) the role of media in Russian society. The study has illustrat-
ed how different stocks of knowledge about these four facets crucially affect the ways in 
which participants navigate and make sense of political news.  
Like any piece of scholarly work, this study has clear limitations. Most im-
portantly, data collection in this explorative project was based on a small number of 
interviews and focused on a very specific group in Russian society. While the design of 
the study thus allows only for cautious generalization of its findings, the approach ap-
pears to open up a whole series of promising avenues for future research. An intriguing 
path for future qualitative studies could be to explore each of these four dimensions in 
more depth. Future research could also investigate the degree to which similar concepts 
apply in other non-democratic contexts, for instance in Asia and in the Arab world. Fur-
thermore, quantitative researchers could use the findings presented here as a starting 
point for designing survey items that capture specific stocks of knowledge about politi-
cal media. In these and many other ways, adopting the concept of literacy in order to 
study news audiences in non-democratic regimes appears to open up highly promising 
paths for future research. By embarking on these, scholars will hopefully be able to con-
tinue the ‘long and proud history’ (Livingstone, 2008: 60) of the concept of literacy 
being linked with processes of enlightenment, political empowerment and democratiza-
tion.   
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